The paper discusses situations in which consumers search through their options in a deliberate order, in contrast to more familiar models with random search. Topics include: network e¤ects (consumers may be better o¤ following the same search order as other consumers); the use of price and non-price advertising to direct search; the impact of consumers starting a new search with their previous supplier; the incentive sellers have to merge or co-locate with other sellers; and the incentive a seller can have to raise its own search cost. I also show how ordered search can be reformulated as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions.
Introduction
Consider a consumer who wishes to purchase one product from several variants available.
In some cases she might know exactly what she wants in advance, and no prior market investigation is needed. In other situations, she might be so ill-informed that she stumbles randomly from one option to another until she discovers something suitable. Between these extremes, though, the consumer has some initial idea about which options are more likely to be suitable, or cheaper, or easier to inspect, and she will deliberately investigate these …rst.
(She will go on to investigate other options if she is disappointed by what she …nds there.)
For instance, in an online book market De los Santos, Hortacsu and Wildenbeest (2012, Table 6 ) report: of those consumers who searched for a book only once, 69% inspected Department of Economics and All Souls College, University of Oxford. Parts of this article re ‡ect joint work with John Vickers and Jidong Zhou, and I am grateful to them for further discussion during its preparation. I am also grateful to Laura Doval, Renaud Foucart, Tobias Gamp, José Luis Moraga, Alexsei Parakhonyak, Vaiva Petrikaite, Régis Renault, Andrew Rhodes, David Sappington, Sandro Shelegia and Chris Wilson for many helpful comments. 1 In footnote 9 Nelson writes that he has a detailed theory of "guided search" which "could not be included here because of space limitations".
2 Ursu (2015) studies such a travel agent empirically. An important feature of her dataset is that the travel agent randomized its recommendations to some consumers, which allows her to study the e¤ect of rank on click rates and purchase decisions in a clean way. In the random order treatment, consumers clicked on links with decreasing frequency further down the page (since presumably they believe the ranking has some content) but their purchase probability contingent on clicking does not depend on page position. However, when the travel agent's true ranking was displayed, the purchase probability did depend strongly on rank, suggesting that the ranking algorithm was indeed useful to consumers as a guide to search. 3 Baye, De los Santos, and Wildenbeest (2016) document how the tra¢ c generated by organic results from a search engine to a retailer depends on both the retailer's prominence on the results page and the prominence of the retailer's brand. (They estimate the latter by measuring how frequently consumers search for the brand by name when looking for a product.) use a search engine it might be that the most relevant seller for them is the seller that bids the most to be displayed …rst in the sponsored search results, in which case consumers should inspect sellers in the order they appear on the results page.
If other consumers follow a particular search order, it can be optimal for an individual consumer to do the same. When many consumers search through sellers in the same order, a seller placed earlier in this order will often set a lower price than its rivals further back. A seller placed further back knows that a consumer it encounters is likely to have been disappointed in the o¤ers received so far-from the seller's perspective, this is a form of advantageous selection-and so it can a¤ord to set a high price. In such cases, an individual consumer then does better to search in the same order as other consumers.
Because of this, if other consumers use a rule of thumb for choosing which seller to inspect …rst-for example, as above they …rst inspect the seller which advertises with the greatest intensity, or even if they use a more ad hoc procedure such as searching through sellers in alphabetical order-then an individual consumer should do the same. Similarly, it may be that one seller has managed to achieve a "low price image" which induces consumers to try there …rst, and in equilibrium this seller does have an incentive to choose lower prices.
This kind of self-ful…lling prophecy means that a highly skewed pattern of sales can emerge even in symmetric environments.
Some products have lower search costs than others. For instance, geography or shop layout determines a consumer's search order, and she might choose to inspect the nearest option …rst (which might be di¤erent for di¤erent consumers). In a physical store it is easier to inspect products displayed at eye level or on the ground ‡oor, regulation might require certain products to be on the "top shelf", while unhealthy products aimed at children might pro…tably be placed at a lower height. Judicious design of store layout might mean that a multiproduct seller can force the consumer to consider its products in a particular order.
Consumers might …nd it less costly to inspect a new product from a supplier they have used before than from a new supplier, perhaps because they have contact details readily available.
Another way to reduce search costs is to …rst visit a location (either physical or online) known to have a concentration of varieties of the relevant product. A cluster with several suppliers not only allows a better chance of …nding a good product, but competition between suppliers within the cluster might lead to lower prices. Similarly, a consumer might choose to …rst visit a "big box"store which stocks more varieties of the product in question.
However, because pricing is coordinated within the store, it is likely that the store will set a higher price than its smaller rivals, and consumers choosing their search order have to trade o¤ the one-stop shopping bene…ts of greater variety with the higher price they will have to pay there.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the principles governing optimal sequential search in fairly general terms, and shows how the search problem can be reformulated as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions. Section 3 uses this theory to describe outcomes in a model where sellers choose prices for their products. In simple settings where each consumer views the sellers as symmetric ex ante, this model often exhibits multiple equilibria: the consumer search order depends on which sellers choose lower prices, and the prices that sellers choose depend on where they are in the search order. Random consumer search is one equilibrium (and is often the focus of existing oligopoly models), although it is often an unstable equilibrium. However, if the demand system is "smoothed", by making individual consumers have su¢ ciently heterogeneous preferences over sellers, the market might have a single equilibrium.
Extensions to this basic model are presented in section 4, which aim to illustrate several of the reasons for ordered search described above. These include discussions of how multiseller clusters and "big box" sellers should often be inspected …rst by consumers, how sellers chooses prices when they anticipate that consumers start a new search process with their previous supplier, how it might be pro…table for a seller to deliberately increase its inspection costs, and the impact of both price and non-price advertising on market outcomes. Section 5 suggests some promising options for further research. The relevant literature, much of which is very recent, is discussed as I present various aspects of ordered search in the paper.
Opening the box
Consider a consumer who wishes to select one product from several variants which are available. One way to model this decision problem is to suppose that the consumer knows in advance her idiosyncratic match utility for each product i, say v i , and knows in advance each product's price, p i , and chooses the option with the highest net surplus v i p i provided this is positive. This is the "discrete choice"problem. This paper studies another scenario, where before purchase the consumer needs to incur a cost s i to discover product i's characteristics, v i and p i . (In section 4.5 I also study a scenario between these two extremes, where consumers know each product's price in advance but need to discover the associated match utility.
4 ) The kinds of products where consumers have idiosyncratic tastes, and which they usually wish to inspect in some way before buying (even if they know the price in advance), include cameras, cars, clothing, furniture, hotels, novels, perfume, and pets.
Before studying in the next section how equilibrium prices in an oligopoly are determined, we …rst describe the risk-neutral consumer's optimal search strategy for a given set of options. Weitzman (1979) provides the key to understanding optimal sequential search through a …nite number of mutually exclusive options ("boxes") with uncertain payo¤s.
The consumer's payo¤ from option i is a random variable v i 0, where her payo¤s are independently distributed across options with CDF F i (v i ) for option i. (It is natural to suppose the payo¤ v i is non-negative if the consumer has an outside option of zero.) To discover the realization of v i inside box i involves the non-refundable inspection cost s i .
There is free recall, so that the consumer can costlessly return to claim the payo¤ from a box opened earlier. The consumer wishes to consume at most one of the options, and aims to maximize the expected value of the consumed option net of total search costs. To do this she decides both the order in which to inspect options and the rule for when to terminate search (in which case she consumes the best option opened so far). Weitzman refers to this as "Pandora's problem", and the consumer is female in this paper.
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For now, suppose that i E i v i > s i for each i, for otherwise it is never optimal to open box i and this option can be eliminated from her choice problem. (Here, E i denotes taking expectations with respect to the distribution for v i .) De…ne the "reservation price"
of box i to be the unique price r i which satis…es
(Since i > s i , this reservation price is positive.) In terms of demand theory, r i is the highest price such that the consumer is willing to incur the sunk cost s i for the right to purchase the product at that price once she has discovered her match utility. The expected incremental bene…t of inspecting box i given that the consumer already has secured a potential payo¤ x 0 to which she can freely return is
which is positive if and only if her current payo¤ x is below the reservation price r i .
Weitzman shows that an optimal search strategy in this context-"Pandora's rule"-is as follows.
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Selection rule: If a box is to be opened, it should be the unopened box with the highest reservation price;
Stopping rule: Terminate search whenever the maximum payo¤ discovered so far exceeds the reservation price of all unopened boxes (which is zero if no box remains unopened), and consume the option with this maximum payo¤.
For instance, suppose there are three boxes with respective reservation prices r i and realized payo¤s v i given by (r 1 ; v 1 ) = (5; 2) ; (r 2 ; v 2 ) = (10; 4) ; (r 3 ; v 3 ) = (3; 7) :
Then the consumer (who of course does not know the realized payo¤ v i until she opens that box) should …rst inspect box 2 as that has the highest reservation price, should go on to inspect box 1 (since that box has reservation price above her current payo¤ v 2 = 4), then come back to consume the payo¤ in box 2 without inspecting box 3 (since v 2 is above both v 1 and r 3 ).
The reservation price in (1) depends only on the properties of that option, i.e., s i and F i . The reservation price for a box is not the same as that box's stand-alone surplus, i s i . If the consumer could only choose one box to open, she would choose the box with the highest value of i s i , which need not be the box with the highest r i . 7 As is intuitive, the reservation price in (1) is decreasing in s i and increasing in [1 F i ( )]. In addition, since it depends on the right-tail of the distribution, all else equal it is increasing in the "riskiness" of the option. As Weitzman (1979, page 647) puts it: "Other things 6 The optimality of this rule depends on a number of factors. When the consumer cannot freely return to an earlier opened box, it may not be optimal to inspect boxes in order of their reservation values. See Salop (1973) for an investigation of optimal order of search when there is no recall (which is a common assumption in the job search literature). Olszewski and Weber (2015) discuss how the rule needs to be modi…ed when the agent gains utility from all opened boxes, while Doval (2014) considers the situation where the agent can consume the contents of a box without inspecting it …rst (and without incurring the search cost).
7 Chade and Smith (2006) analyze which boxes to inspect in non-sequential search.
being equal, it is optimal to sample …rst from distributions which are more spread out or riskier in hopes of striking it rich early and ending the search."
Pandora's rule can conveniently be re-expressed as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions. 8 Speci…cally, Pandora's rule is equivalent to the choice rule whereby the consumer chooses the payo¤ from the box with the highest index
where v i is the realized payo¤ inside box i. (This is the case in the scenario in (3) above, when box 2 was ultimately selected.) To see this, we show that box j is not chosen under Pandora's rule when w j < w i . If r j < r i , then box i will be inspected before j, and j could then be chosen only if it is inspected, which requires v i < r j , and then only if v i < v j , which taken together contradict the assumption w j < w i . If instead r j > r i , then box j is inspected before i. But then w j < w i implies v j < minfr i ; v i g, which implies that box j is not consumed before …rst inspecting i, which then reveals a superior payo¤. In either case, the inequality w j < w i implies that box j is not chosen. Since some box is eventually chosen under Pandora's rule, we deduce it is the box with the highest w i . In sum, while the box-speci…c index r i determines which box the consumer opens …rst, the box-speci…c index w i determines which box is ultimately selected. 9 As shown in Theorem 1 in Kleinberg, Waggoner, and Weyl (2016) , which itself builds on Weber (1992) , this reformulation of Pandora's rule allows for the elegant proof of Weitzman's result which is presented in Appendix A below.
When a population of consumers choose their options it will often be the case that consumers di¤er in their reservation price r i for box i. For instance, consumers might di¤er in their cost of inspecting a given box (e.g., due to their di¤erent geographic locations) or in their prior distribution for a box's match utility. An individual consumer is characterized by her list of reservation prices (r 1 ; r 2 ; :::) and her list of realized payo¤s (v 1 ; v 2 ; :::) which via (4) generate the list (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::). This heterogeneous population of consumers selecting an option via optimal sequential search can equivalently be modelled as engaging in a discrete choice problem, where the type-(w 1 ; w 2 ; :::) consumer simply selects the option 8 This discussion develops the analysis in Armstrong and Vickers (2015, pages 303-4) , where we showed how a search problem with free recall of earlier options can be recast as a discrete choice problem without search frictions. (This reformulation is not possible without free recall of earlier options.) 9 Since E i w i = E i [v i maxfv i r i ; 0g] = i s i , the expected value of the parameter w i is the stand-alone surplus from box i.
with the highest w i . The joint distribution of (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::) in the consumer population then determines the demand for each option. Figure 1 depicts the optimal search order with two sellers in terms of the pair (r 1 ; r 2 ). In particular, a consumer's decision about which seller to inspect …rst is akin to a discrete choice problem where a consumer values option i at r i and chooses the option with the highest payo¤ r i p i (or, as shown in the shaded region, the outside option zero if that is superior to engaging in search).
While her search order depends on anticipated prices (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::), a consumer's purchase decision depends also on the actual prices (p 1 ;p 2 ; :::). Since the payo¤ from purchasing from seller i is v i p i , the discrete choice reformulation in section 2 shows that seller i's demand is the fraction of consumers for whom the index
is positive and higher than the corresponding index from all rival sellers. For a given list of anticipated prices, this determines demand for the various sellers in terms of their actual prices. Equilibrium in this market occurs when the Bertrand equilibrium in actual prices (p 1 ;p 2 ; :::) given anticipated prices (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::) coincides with these anticipated prices.
Equivalently, returning to the underlying search formulation, equilibrium occurs when (i) consumers choose their order of search optimally given the prices they anticipate sellers choose, and (ii) each seller chooses its price to maximize its pro…t given the consumer search order and the prices chosen by rival sellers, and this price coincides with the price anticipated by consumers. Intuitively, the …rst term r i p i in (5) is rarely relevant when the search cost for seller i is small, and this seller sells when v i p i is positive and higher than the corresponding surplus from rivals.
To illustrate, consider an example with two sellers and costless production. Each consumer has match utility v i for product i = 1; 2 which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1] and has reservation price r i for this product which is also independently and uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. (From (1), the search cost corresponding to r i is given by
(1 r i ) 2 and so lies in the interval [0; Figure 1 , if a consumer searches at all she will …rst inspect the seller for which she has the higher r i . Each consumer searches in a deterministic order, but that order di¤ers across consumers.
If this example is modi…ed so that all search costs are zero-in which case r i 1 and w i in (5) is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]-the symmetric equilibrium price is p = p 2 1 0:41, which is below the corresponding price with search frictions. It is intuitive that more signi…cant search frictions will tend to increase equilibrium prices. Consider a particular seller in the market. If the inspection costs for this seller rise, it will tend to encounter fewer but more "desperate"consumers who have not found a good option from other sellers, and this will typically give it the opportunity to raise its price. Likewise, if the inspection costs for its rivals increase, this reduces the distribution for r j , and hence w j , from rivals and again this tends to give the seller an incentive to raise its price. In sum, if inspection costs rise, either for a single seller or across the market, this is likely to 11 As usual, there are also less interesting equilibria in which consumers anticipate that seller i chooses such a high price that it is not worthwhile to inspect this seller, and then this seller has no way to attract consumers to it and might as well set this very high price. In this example, for instance, there is also an equilibrium where seller 1 sets price p 1 = 1 and no one inspects it, while seller 2 sets the monopoly price p 2 = raise each seller's equilibrium price.
The "double uniform"example above involves a demand system which is smooth, in the sense that small changes in anticipated prices p i do not lead to discrete changes in demands.
In other situations-which include those commonly studied in the literature-the demand system is not smooth. Speci…cally, consider the situation in which each consumer considers sellers to be symmetric ex ante, so that (in the duopoly case) reservation prices on Figure   1 lie on the 45 o line. Here, when one seller is expected to o¤er a lower price, all consumers who search will choose to inspect it …rst. There is a strong possibility of multiple equilibria in such a market: the consumer search order depends sensitively on anticipated prices, while a seller's price usually depends on where it is placed in the search order.
To discuss this point in more detail, suppose each consumer has the same CDF F (v)
for match utility and the same inspection cost s from each seller, and hence has the same reservation price r for each seller's product. Suppose also that each seller has the same production cost c. This is the framework analyzed in the in ‡uential models of Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) , under the assumption that consumers search randomly through sellers. In contrast to these earlier papers, suppose instead that all consumers search through sellers in the same order.
12 If the hazard rate for match utility,
, is strictly increasing in v, then more prominent sellers (i.e., sellers closer to the start of this search order) have more elastic demand than those sellers placed further back. For this reason, more prominent sellers typically set lower prices, which in turn rationalizes the assumed consumer search order. Intuitively, a seller inspected earlier in a consumer's search order knows that a prospective consumer is likely to have a superior outside option relative to the situation where a seller is inspected later-a later seller only encounters a consumer if that consumer was disappointed by her options so far-and with an increasing hazard rate, a seller who knows a consumer has a better outside option will choose to set a lower price. A more detailed argument for why a prominent seller faces more elastic demand is presented in Appendix C below.
To see how ordered search can be an equilibrium in a symmetric environment, suppose there are two symmetric sellers and look for an equilibrium where p i < p j so that seller i is inspected …rst by all consumers. Here, the pattern of demand for the two sellers is shown in Figure 2 . 13 Appendix D below calculates equilibrium prices for various search costs when production is costless and match utility is uniformly distributed, and shows how the prominent …rm indeed chooses a lower price in equilibrium (see Figure 4 in the appendix).
Thus there are two equilibria with ordered search, one where all consumers inspect seller 1 …rst and one where they inspect seller 2 …rst. There is also a third, symmetric, equilibrium, where exactly half the consumers …rst inspect each seller and where the two sellers set the same price. However, this symmetric equilibrium-which is the focus of the analysis in Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) -is unstable: if slightly more consumers …rst inspect one seller, that seller chooses to set a lower price than its rival, so that all consumers will strictly prefer to visit that seller …rst. Thus, this is a classic "tipping" market, and we expect one low-price seller will be inspected …rst by all consumers even though sellers are symmetric ex ante.
Figure 2: Demand for the two sellers when p i < p j Consumers may well be worse o¤ in an equilibrium with ordered search where they all inspect one seller …rst compared to the equilibrium with random search. 15 Intuitively, faced with the increasing price path which goes with ordered search, consumers cease their search too early and competition between sellers is weakened. In this market with ordered search, the seller which inspected …rst has larger demand for two reasons: even with equal prices its demand would be larger because it is inspected …rst (its extra demand the "north-east"region on Figure 2 ), while its lower price reinforces this e¤ect. The result is that the distribution of sales across sellers is more skewed than it would be in a market with random search or in a market without search frictions. In the example analyzed in Appendix D, sales are equal for the two sellers when search frictions are absent, but the prominent seller sells up to twice as much as its rival when search costs are larger. As search frictions increase, we expect that the prominent seller's sales volume increases, while the non-prominent seller's sales volume will fall (see Figure 5 ).
In this market where sellers are symmetric ex ante, in the stable equilibrium where all consumers visit one prominent seller …rst this seller makes greater pro…t than its rival. (The prominent seller could choose the equilibrium price of its rival, in which case it has greater demand and more pro…t, but in general is even better o¤ with another price.) The impact on pro…t of an increase in search frictions will often di¤er for the two sellers. 16 Pro…t for the prominent seller will rise with s since both its price and its demand do. The impact on the non-prominent seller's pro…t, though, depends on two opposing forces-its price rises, but its demand is likely to fall-and the result is that its pro…t can be non-monotonic in the search cost (see Figure 6 ). When there are no search frictions both sellers choose the same price and obtain the same pro…t. As s increases both sellers'pro…ts initially rise, but for larger s the non-prominent seller's pro…t falls as search frictions increase. In this second region, less prominent sellers will favour consumer policy which reduces search frictions, while such a policy would be opposed by more prominent sellers.
The existence of multiple equilibria can make it hard to do comparative statics, such as whether a higher-quality …rm (where the match valuation distribution comes from a better CDF) sets a higher price or is inspected …rst or whether a …rm with a higher inspection cost is inspected later. For this reason a smooth demand system, where di¤erent consumers prefer to search in di¤erent orders, might work better (as well as often being more plausible). However, such a model can be cumbersome to work with beyond speci…c search relative to the price with random search, provided there are at least four sellers. 16 See also the discussion and Figure 2 in Zhou (2011) . By contrast, with random search (and no outside option), Anderson and Renault (1999, Proposition 1) show that the symmetric equilibrium pro…t for each seller increases with the search cost, provided the hazard rate is increasing. examples or without resorting to numerical methods.
One convenient way to simplify this framework is to study monopolistic competition with many symmetric sellers (Wolinsky, 1986) , when a stable equilibrium with symmetric prices exists in a broad class of cases.
17 When a consumer expects all sellers to o¤er the same price p < r, a consumer will search until she …nds a product with v r and will never return to a previous seller. 18 Thus a seller has no "return demand", which was the source of the incentive for prominent …rms to set lower prices, and a seller sets the same price regardless of its place in the search order. The result is that consumers do not care how other consumers choose to search, and there is no tendency to tip. The symmetric equilibrium price, p say, when consumers are also symmetric is derived as follows. Consider a seller who meets a consumer. If it chooses pricep the consumer will buy from it if v p r p, and so the seller's pro…t from this consumer is
In equilibrium, this must be maximized atp = p, which yields the unique …rst-order condition
The equilibrium markup and industry pro…t in this market, (1 F (r))=f (r), depends on the shape of the CDF F (v) and the magnitude of search frictions. Consumers have an incentive to participate in this market provided that p in (6) is below r. When the hazard rate f =(1 F ) increases, the equilibrium price in (6) decreases with r and hence increases with the search cost s. In such cases, a reduction in search frictions yields a double bene…t to consumers: their average match utility is higher and the price they pay is lower. Although this model of monopolistic competition does not necessarily involve ordered search, it is useful starting point for some of the applications and extensions to this basic framework presented in the next section.
17 Anderson and Renault (1999) show that a symmetric equilibrium with monopolistic competition exists provided that the hazard rate is increasing.
18 Anderson and Renault (2015) discuss another way to obtain this simplifying feature. They suppose that the distribution for match utilities for a given seller has an atom at zero combined with a continuous distribution with a support well away from zero, and they …nd equilibria with ordered search where each seller sets price so that any consumer it encounters buys immediately when she has non-zero match utility.
Applications and extensions

Mergers and clusters
There are a number of situations in which consumers incur a single search cost to inspect several products at once. For instance, a single seller might stock several product variants, or several single-product sellers might cluster in a single location. Unless the equilibrium price is signi…cantly higher in a multiproduct location, consumers may then choose to inspect such a location before any of the single-product locations.
To discuss this in more detail, consider a situation with monopolistic competition, where a large number of ex ante symmetric sellers each supply a single variant of the product, so that the equilibrium price is given by p in (6). Suppose that two of these sellers merge to form a "big box" seller which supplies two of the product variants. When a consumer inspects this seller, she incurs the same search cost s as with any other seller but sees two options (each with an independent match utility from the CDF F (v) and an associated price), from which she will select the better one if she buys from this seller. 19 In regular cases, the merged …rm will choose the same price for each variant, and so this seller can be considered to be another single-product …rm but one that has a better CDF for its match utility given by F 2 instead of F . Typically, the merged …rm will adjust its price upwards relative to its rivals, which in this monopolistic competition framework continue to set the same price p. To understand this, observe that when the merged …rm meets a consumer it will sell when its match utility and price satisfy v p r p, and so it choosesp to
-and the big box store will set a higher price than its single-product rivals.
Whether a consumer has an incentive to inspect this merged …rm …rst depends on how high its price is. If its price does not rise by too much, a consumer will wish to inspect this multiproduct seller …rst, in which case the merger is pro…table. For instance, in the example where v is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], the search cost is s = in (6). The reservation price for the merged …rm's match utility can be calculated to be about 0.817 and its price to be 0.268. Since the di¤erence between these is greater than r p = 1 2
, it is optimal for consumers to visit the merged …rm 19 Section 4.2 discusses issues of intra-…rm search and store layout, which are sidestepped by the assumption that once at the seller the consumer costlessly observes all its options.
…rst. The better chance of …nding a good product in the big store outweighs the higher price the consumer must pay there. 20 More generally, a group of sellers …nds it pro…table to merge if the merger serves to attract consumers to visit the merged …rm …rst, and this can only be the case if consumer surplus rises as a result of the merger. Thus, in this framework there is a tendency for pro…table mergers to bene…t consumers, in contrast to the situation in many other oligopoly models.
This discussion is a simpli…ed version of the model studied in Moraga-Gonzalez and Petrikaite (2013) . That paper discussed the case of oligopoly rather than monopolistic competition, and showed that a merger which results in search economies can be pro…table for the merging …rms but reduces the pro…t of non-merging …rms since they are pushed further back in the consumer search order. 21 This contrasts with a more standard analysis of Bertrand price competition, where a merger typically raises the pro…ts of non-merging …rms.
Related issues arise when one seller decides to co-locate with another seller. To discuss this point further, suppose that when this occurs a consumer pays the single search cost s to visit the cluster, where she then observes both …rms'prices and match utilities. Unlike the case with a merger, here sellers in the cluster do not coordinate their pricing, and a seller aims to attract business from its neighboring rival as well as to prevent a consumer from leaving to inspect other locations. Provided the hazard rate is increasing, intra-cluster competition will typically mean that the price is lower in the cluster than elsewhere. If its rival sets price p 0 and o¤ers match utility v 0 , then a seller which sets pricep and o¤ers v will sell if v p maxfv 0 p 0 ; r pg. (By contrast, a seller on its own will sell under the weaker condition v p r p, so that its potential consumers have a worse outside option than those of a seller in the cluster). In the uniform example discussed in the merger scenario, one can check that the equilibrium price in the two-seller location is about 0:232, which is 20 If many single-product sellers merge, however, then a consumer is almost sure to …nd a product with almost the maximum possible match utility, and so consumers essentially know their match utility from this seller. This implies that Diamond (1971)'s paradox applies, and the seller will set a price which just deters onward search, and this gives the consumer no incentive to incur the search cost to visit this very large store. (See Villas-Boas (2009) for related analysis in a monopoly context.) It may take many products for this e¤ect to operate, however. In the example in the text, if the large store contains 50 product variants it is still worthwhile for the consumer to inspect this seller …rst, even though its price is nearly double that of single-variant sellers. 21 One advantage of using a monopolistic competition framework is that the problem of multiple equilibria seems less severe. In oligopoly, when a merger occurs the new equilibrium might involve the merged …rm being at the start, or at the rear, of the consumer search order.
. Therefore, since consumers obtain a better distribution for their match utility and a lower price, they will all choose to visit the cluster …rst. Because of this new-found prominence, both of the sellers there are better o¤ despite the tougher competition they face in the shared location.
A number of papers have discussed a seller's choice between a concentrated location alongside other sellers, which attracts many consumers but where competition may be …erce, and having a more isolated location which allows the seller to exploit the few consumers who do pass through. These papers discuss the equilibrium con…guration of sellers, including when it is an equilibrium for all sellers to locate in a single cluster. 22 The paper closest to my discussion above is Fischer and Harrington (1996) , who present a model with di¤erentiated products, one cluster location and many "peripheral" sellers, and consumers who choose their search order based on rational expectations of prices chosen by sellers in the cluster and by peripheral sellers and their own idiosyncractic search costs.
They also document empirically which product sectors around Baltimore are more prone to clustering: shoes and antiques, where consumers like to inspect products before buying, tend to co-locate, whereas gasoline stations are more dispersed. Because of the advantages of clustering in terms of attracting consumers, a seller may be willing to sell its product through an electronic platform which also serves rivals, even though it faces strong price competition there and usually has to pay listing fees to the platform. 
Deliberate obscurity
In Fischer and Harrington (1996) , …rms could choose to locate in the cluster or in the periphery. Some …rms choose the latter, in part because some consumers have search costs such that they only wish to inspect …rms in the periphery. Another issue of interest is whether it might ever be pro…table for a …rm deliberately to raise its own inspection cost-that is, to "obfuscate"-in order to make its rival the prominent seller. For instance, in the UK some well-known insurance companies advertise that their products do not appear on price-comparison websites.
To discuss this in more detail, suppose the initial situation is that there are two sym-22 For instance, see Stahl (1982) , Wolinsky (1983) , Dudey (1990) , Non (2010) and Ellison, Fudenberg, and Mobius (2004) . Scitovsky (1950, page 49) Salop, 1985) . Then consumers will investigate both sellers' o¤ers and buy from the seller with the higher v i p i (if this is positive). In regular cases the equilibrium will be symmetric, and …rms obtain equal pro…t. If one …rm now arti…cially introduces a positive inspection cost, s > 0, this will induce all consumers to inspect the rival …rst (since they have nothing to lose by doing so). The new equilibrium prices will, given an increasing hazard rate, involve the prominent rival choosing the lower price, which reinforces consumer incentives to inspect this …rm …rst. However, this lower price will typically still be higher than the equilibrium price without search frictions, and this could compensate the obfuscating seller for its disadvantaged position. As discussed in section 3, the non-prominent …rm has an incentive to raise its price since the consumers it encounters are not satis…ed with their o¤er from the prominent seller, and because prices are strategic complements this induces the prominent …rm to raise its own price too. For instance, consider the example depicted on Figure 6 below. When one …rm introduces a small inspection cost (i.e., reduces its reservation price r i ), the equilibrium pro…ts are as shown on this …gure, and we see that a small inspection cost boosts the obfuscating …rm's pro…t a little (although the rival's pro…t is boosted more).
Wilson (2010) analyzes this question using a di¤erent duopoly model with a homogeneous product. There are two kinds of consumers: those who can see both prices without cost (even with "obfuscation"), and those who must pay the obfuscation costs arti…cially introduced. In this market with a homogeneous product, without obfuscation there is Bertrand competition and zero pro…t. Wilson shows that it is always in a …rm's interest to obfuscate, with the result that …rms choose their prices according to an asymmetric mixed strategy, costly searchers inspect the transparent …rm …rst, and both …rms make positive pro…t. One di¤erence between Wilson's model and the one presented here is that in my model the obfuscating …rm sets a higher price, while in Wilson's model that …rm (on average) sets a lower price.
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The previous example was rather delicate, and a seller had only a small incentive to 24 Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) also study a model with a homogeneous product but where consumers do not observe a …rm's chosen inspection cost in advance, and so a …rm cannot use obfuscation to in ‡uence search order. They assume that search costs are convex, in the sense that the more time a consumer spends obtaining one seller's o¤er, the less inclined she is to investigate other sellers. Armstrong and Zhou (2016) study another way to create search frictions arti…cially, which is when a seller chooses to make it hard for a consumer to return to buy from it after inspecting a rival seller, for instance by o¤ering the consumer a discount if she chooses to buy without further search.
obfuscate. More striking and robust results are seen in the context of a multiproduct monopolist considering how best to price and present its products. For simplicity, consider a situation where the seller has costless production and supplies two symmetric products, 1 and 2, where each consumer's match utility for product i is an independent draw from the CDF F (v). (The argument which follows is strengthened with asymmetric products, since then the seller can use arti…cial search frictions to divert demand from low-margin to high-margin products.) Suppose that unless the seller deliberately obfuscates, a consumer observes both prices and both match utilities from the start, and chooses the product with the higher surplus v i p i (if this is positive). In regular cases, the seller will then choose the same price for both products, which is chosen to maximize p[1 F 2 (p)].
However, the seller can always do better than this by making one product, say product 2, costly to inspect, while leaving product 1 costless to inspect (which is therefore inspected …rst by all consumers). Indeed, we will see that the seller can then obtain as pro…t the maximum value of
Here, (7) represents the pro…t obtained if the seller could …rst o¤er product 1 to the consumer, at price p 1 , and the consumer chooses whether or not to buy this product myopically, without considering the subsequent option to buy product 2. Since the pro…t in (7) coincides with the "frictionless"pro…t p[1 F 2 (p)] with uniform prices p 1 = p 2 = p, it is clear that the maximum pro…t in (7) is above the maximum pro…t without obfuscation.
Maximizing (7) involves choosing p 2 = p M , where p M is the monopoly price for a single product, i.e., which maximizes p[1 F (p)]. Suppose the seller makes the consumer incur the search cost s for the second product so that a consumer just willing to inspect this product when priced at p M if she has no other option, so that s satis…es
Suppose also that the seller chooses its prominent price p 1 to maximize (7) given p 2 = p M , which implies p 1 > p M = p 2 . Although consumers cannot observe p 2 in advance, it is an equilibrium for consumers to anticipate the price p 2 = p M and for the seller to maximize its pro…t by choosing this price. (If consumers anticipate p 2 = p M , and have to incur the search cost s in (8) to …nd the corresponding match utility, Pandora's rule states they will only choose to inspect this product if their match utility from the …rst product, v 1 , is below the …rst price, p 1 . Therefore, no consumer will ever return to buy the …rst product if they inspect the second, and so the seller chooses p 2 maximize its pro…t as if it only sold this single product.)
In sum, it is a credible strategy for the seller to choose the two prices p 1 and p 2 which maximize (7) and to introduce the arti…cial inspection cost s de…ned in (8) for product 2, and this strategy generates higher pro…t than the situation without search frictions. This policy involves an expensive product being prominently displayed, perhaps at eye level, while a cheaper product is deliberately displayed inconveniently and the consumer has to look "high and low"for a good deal. Somewhat akin to the model in Deneckere and McAfee (1996) , where a seller deliberately reduces the quality of one product variant in order to facilitate price discrimination, here the seller chooses to "damage" its retail environment.
In regular cases, the prominent product's price p 1 will rise while the obscure product's price p 2 falls, relative to the situation without search frictions. 25 In such cases, consumers are harmed by the obfuscation policy: the search cost (8) eliminates all consumer surplus from product 2, while the price for product 1 is increased.
I presented here a simple variant of the model in Petrikaite (2015) , who analyzes cases with more products, with asymmetric products, and with competition between multiproduct sellers. For instance, she shows that when products di¤er in quality, the seller will choose to obfuscate the lower quality product. Gamp (2016) studies a related model where all prices are observed by consumers from the start, and the seller can choose to make it harder to inspect a product's match utility. Among other results, he shows by example that obfuscation of this form can increase total welfare: the bene…ts of the low price for the obscure product outweigh the extra search costs incurred.
Repeat business
In markets with ordered consumer search, tiny asymmetries between sellers can translate into major di¤erences in their pro…ts. There is a signi…cant advantage to a seller being placed early in the consumer search order, simply because it meets more consumers than its rivals placed further back. Since consumers in near-symmetric situations are near-25 Starting from the uniform price which maximizes p[1 F 2 (p)], one can check that pro…t in (7) is locally increasing in p 1 and decreasing in p 2 . Note in particular that with coordinated pricing the prominent product is likely to have a higher price than more obscure products, which is the reverse pattern predicted in section 3 when products are supplied by separate sellers. See Zhou (2009) for further discussion of this comparison.
indi¤erent about which seller to inspect …rst, it does not take much inducement to favour one seller in the search order, which then causes that seller to enjoy a discrete jump in its sales and pro…t. For instance, consider the case of monopolistic competition, where the equilibrium price from each seller is (6) regardless of the search order. With random search each seller obtains negligible sales and pro…t, while if one seller manages to be placed …rst in the search order-perhaps because it is slightly easier to inspect or it has a slightly superior CDF for match utility-its pro…t jumps to
One way to introduce small asymmetries between sellers is to consider a framework where sellers supply various products over time and consumers purchase repeatedly. (This discussion is taken from Armstrong and Zhou, 2011, section 3.) Here, it seems plausible that a consumer who previously purchased from one seller might …rst inspect the same seller when she searches for a second product, even if there is no correlation in her match utilities for the various products. 26 For instance, she may have the contact details of this seller to hand. In this case, the supplier of one product to a consumer becomes prominent for that consumer when she starts the search process for the next product.
In more detail, suppose there are two product categories, 1 and 2, which consumers buy sequentially-for instance, a bank account …rst and then a mortgage-each of which is supplied by many sellers in monopolistic competition. For product category i = 1; 2, the reservation price is r i , the CDF for the match utility is F i (v), the production cost is c i , while the factor sellers use to discount pro…ts from the second product when they supply the …rst product is . As in expression (9), when a supplier sells product 1 to a consumer, that consumer will go on to generate pro…t from the second product equal to
, and anticipating this pro…t the equilibrium price for the …rst product will be
(All sellers set the same price for the second product.) Thus, the promise of pro…t from the second product induces …rms to lower the price for the …rst product, perhaps to below its cost. When search frictions are larger for the second product, this will usually lead …rms to o¤er a lower price for the …rst product. This outcome is reminiscent of markets with switching costs. When switching costs are small, though, they have little impact on the outcome, while here a tiny "default bias" leads to large e¤ects, and these e¤ects bene…t consumers.
Garcia and Shelegia (2015) present a related model, where a consumer is inclined to start her search process at a seller where she has observed someone else make a purchase.
Again, because making a sale makes the seller prominent in a consumer's mind, albeit a di¤erent consumer's mind, sellers have an incentive to price low in equilibrium.
Non-price advertising
Non-price advertising can be used by sellers to achieve prominence if consumers are more likely to …rst inspect those sellers which advertise most heavily. This consumer behaviour might stem from psychological factors, if consumers most easily recall sellers from which they have seen adverts. Alternatively, rational consumers could use advertising intensity as a means by which to coordinate on their search order or as a means to choose which seller is more likely to provide a suitable product.
Consider …rst a situation with rational consumers who use advertising to coordinate on their …rst seller, anticipating that the price will be lower from the seller which spends the most on advertising. (As discussed in section 3, of the hazard-rate condition holds and sellers are symmetric ex ante, when a fraction of consumers use the rule of thumb of …rst inspecting that seller which advertises the most, that seller will choose a lower price and it is optimal to mimic that search order.) Consider a two-stage framework where two risk-neutral sellers …rst choose their advertising intensities and then choose their prices.
Let H be a seller's equilibrium pro…t (excluding advertising costs) in the second stage if it is prominent and let L < H be the corresponding pro…t for the non-prominent seller.
The …rst stage, in which sellers compete to become prominent by advertising the most, is then a symmetric all-pay auction with complete information. 27 It is clear that no pure strategy equilibrium for advertising can exist, since spending a little more than your rival on advertising generates a discrete jump in pro…t. However, a simple symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for advertising exists. If H(a) denotes the equilibrium probability that a seller spends less than a on advertising in the …rst stage, a seller's expected pro…t when it spends a on advertising is
(With probability H(a) it wins the contest and enjoys high pro…t H , and otherwise it becomes the less prominent seller.) Since a seller can obtain pro…t L by not advertising at all, in equilibrium pro…t in (10) ( H L ) on advertising on average, and since we expect that the bene…t of prominence, H L , is higher when the search cost s is higher (for instance, see Figure 6 ), this model suggests that there is more advertising in markets with higher search frictions. Competition to advertise the most acts to dissipate pro…t so that sellers earn average pro…t equal to the low level associated with not being prominent, L , which as shown on Figure 6 can decrease with the search cost s.
This analysis is similar to Bagwell and Ramey (1994) , who analyze a model where sellers o¤er a homogeneous product and consumers must choose from where to buy before they observe the seller's choice of price. Because sellers in their model have increasing returns to scale, when more consumers turn up to buy from a seller that seller o¤ers a lower price. Thus, consumers bene…t from coordinating on a seller, and a fraction of consumers rationally go to the seller which advertises the most heavily as the means with which to do this. By contrast, the model above assumes no economies of scale but instead uses the feature that sellers who attract more …rst visits have more elastic demand. Bagwell and Ramey (1994) also report empirical studies (for eye-glasses, liquor, and prescription drugs) which show how prices were lower and market structure was more concentrated in markets where advertising was permitted, even when prices could not be advertised. Haan and Moraga-Gonzalez (2011) analyze a related model, but where a seller's share of …rst-inspections is continuous in its choice of advertising intensity instead of the "winner take all"formulation discussed here. They focus on a symmetric equilibrium where sellers advertise with the same intensity, obtain the same share of initial searches, and so charge the same price. Their model involves behavioural rather than fully rational consumers: if one seller advertises slightly more heavily than its rival and this induces more consumers to inspect it …rst, that seller will charge a lower price and hence all consumers should rationally visit that seller …rst.
An alternative scenario involves advertising intensity being associated with the most suitable, rather than the cheapest, products. For instance, consider a stylized setting where prices are not modelled and sellers di¤er in how many consumers …nd their products suitable. Speci…cally, a type-q seller o¤ers a product which each consumer has probability q of …nding suitable, in which case the consumer obtains payo¤ 1, and with remaining probability 1 q she obtains payo¤ zero, while a seller obtains payo¤ 1 each time its product is sold. Here, sellers di¤er only in their probability of being suitable, q, which is private information and generated by the continuous CDF G(q) with support [q min ; q max ].
Suppose a consumer's search cost s satis…es 0 < s < q min , so that this cost is small enough that a consumer always wishes to inspect another seller if she has not yet found a suitable product. To minimize her search costs, a consumer would like to inspect sellers in order of decreasing q if she could identify that order.
One could study this market when, as above, a seller's advertising is simply "broadcast" without mediation and consumers …rst inspect the seller which advertises the most heavily. However, it is perhaps implausible that consumers can really detect accurately which seller advertises the most heavily, especially when sellers advertise a similar amount.
An alternative scenario involves sellers paying to be advertised on a search engine, where the seller who chooses to pay more is listed higher up the sponsored results page (which is a transparent signal for consumers to observe). Provided that better sellers do choose to pay more, it is optimal for consumers to inspect sellers-that is, to click on their links-in the order they appear on the results page.
29 If a consumer clicks on its link a seller will obtain payo¤ 1 with probability q, and so q is the value of a click to the type-q seller.
In broad terms, sponsored search auctions allocate sellers to prominent positions, require sellers to pay the search engine fee each time a consumer clicks on their link, and use a second-price auction format. In more detail, consider the situation with just two sellers. 29 Note that in this framework the top link is not intrinsically easier to inspect. It may be more realistic to suppose for psychological reasons that some consumers do …nd it easiest to work downwards through the links, but this will only reinforce the incentive to pay for prominence.
These sellers are invited to submit sealed bids, the higher bidder is listed …rst and pays the bid of the losing seller on a per-click basis, while the losing seller pays nothing but is placed second on the page. We look for a symmetric equilibrium in which the type-q seller bids B(q), where B( ) is a strictly increasing function. Such a bidding function can be derived using standard auction techniques. Suppose that the type-q seller bids as if it had type q 0 , i.e., bids B(q 0 ), while its rival has uncertain typeq and bids B(q), in which case the seller is listed …rst whenq < q 0 . When it is listed …rst, consumers inspect it …rst and so it sells to a consumer with probability q. If it loses the auction it is placed second, in which case it sells when the rival doesn't sell and when its own product is suitable, i.e., with probability (1 q)q. Putting this together implies the seller's expected pro…t when
and di¤erentiating this expression with respect to q 0 and setting q 0 = q reveals that the equilibrium bid function is
Here, q 2 is the incremental pro…t for a type-q seller from being in the …rst versus the second position when its rival also has type q. Since the bidding function (11) is increasing, the more suitable seller is willing to pay more for the right to be listed …rst, with the result that consumers rationally sift through their options in the order they appear on the search engine's results page. In this setting, the observation that consumers click more often on results placed higher up the sponsored results page is driven by the information content of the ordering, rather than "inert"consumers who blindly follow the suggested order.
This discussion of advertising on a search engine is a simple variant of Athey and Ellison (2011) . 30 As they put it (page 1215): "a search engine that presents sponsored links should be thought of as an information intermediary that contributes to welfare by providing information (in the form of an ordered list) that allows consumers to search more e¢ ciently". Instead of the sealed bid format discussed here, they study an ascending bid auction in which bidders observe how many bidders remain in the auction when they decide when to drop out of the bidding. They allow for an arbitrary number of sellers, and consumers have heterogeneous search costs. Unlike the model presented above, this means that consumers face a complex decision about whether to click on one more link if they 30 See also Chen and He (2011) for a related model.
have not been successful so far in their search. They also analyze auction design issues such as the choice of a reserve price.
Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009, section 3) present a model of monopolistic competition, with endogenous prices, when sellers di¤er in the quality of the product they supply (in the sense that their distributions for match utilities are ordered in terms of …rst-order stochastic dominance). In a speci…c setting with uniform distributions for match utility, we show that the highest-quality seller is willing to pay the most to become prominent, and that consumers have an incentive to inspect this seller …rst (even though it chooses a higher price than other sellers). As with sponsored search, a seller's ability to compete for a prominent position can guide consumers towards better, and better value, products.
The models presented in this section provide the "best case"for non-price advertising to be used to guide search: the seller which is willing to pay the most to achieve prominence is the seller which consumers would like to inspect …rst. In other situations, this coincidence of interests need not hold perfectly or at all, and advertising is then a less reliable guide for consumers. For example, in the model of sponsored search, sellers might di¤er both in their likelihood of being suitable and in their expected pro…t from a click. In such a setting, the seller which is willing to bid the most per-click is not always the seller which the most consumers will …nd suitable. Because of this, search engines usually use measures of "relevance" as well as willingness-to-pay per click when they determine the order of sponsored links. 
Price advertising
The …nal extension to the basic model has consumers able to observe all prices from the start, and then choosing the order with which to inspect sellers to discover the corresponding match utility. 32 Unlike the model in section 3 where prices were hidden until inspection, when prices are advertised they can be used to in ‡uence a consumer's search order. In addition, because prices are known in advance, the network e¤ects discussed in section 3 31 See Athey and Ellison (2011, section VI) for further discussion. See also Gomes (2014) for a model in which an intermediary selects one seller from a pool of heterogeneous sellers to display to consumers. The revenue-maximizing mechanism for the intermediary, when it can only obtain revenue from sellers, is a "scoring auction" which balances a seller's willingness-to-pay for display with the consumer's valuation for clicking on the seller's link. 32 We continue to assume that consumers cannot purchase from a seller without incurring the search cost. Even in cases where it is possible to buy without incurring the search cost and without observing the realized match utility, it will be optimal to inspect products before purchase if the search cost is small enough.
do not arise. In the model in section 3 a seller which is prominent often chooses to set a lower price, while in the current scenario with price advertising this causality is reversed and a seller can become prominent by virtue of advertising a lower price.
Consider …rst the monopolistic competition framework above, where the equilibrium price in the absence of price advertising was given in (6). When …rms advertise their price, the only equilibrium involves all sellers choosing price equal to marginal cost. 33 Setting price equal to cost is an equilibrium because when all its rivals do so, a seller cannot do better with a higher price since no consumers will ever inspect it. However, if all …rms advertised price p > c, then a seller could boost its pro…t by advertising a slightly lower price which attracts all consumers to inspect it …rst. Thus, even though there may be signi…cant search frictions and horizontal product di¤erentiation, using prices to become prominent in the consumer search order drives price down to cost.
This framework is more complicated in oligopoly, since sellers have some market power and price equal to cost cannot be an equilibrium. (For instance, with a …nite number of rivals, there is a chance that a seller has the only product a consumer wants.) If consumers view sellers as symmetric ex ante, they will choose to …rst inspect the …rm with the lowest advertised price and slightly undercutting a rival's price causes a discrete jump in pro…t.
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In such situations, prices will be chosen according to mixed strategies in equilibrium. This is a di¢ cult model to work with, however. Unlike more familiar models of random pricing, such as Varian (1980) , here the prices o¤ered by higher-price sellers continue to a¤ect the demand of the "winning"seller, since some consumers will buy from more expensive sellers if their products have a better match. This combination of product di¤erentiation and mixed strategies is usually hard to solve explicitly.
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The framework is made more tractable, as well as often more plausible, if consumer demand is smoothed by supposing that consumers di¤er ex ante in which seller they wish to inspect …rst, given a set of advertised prices. 36 As discussed earlier, this sequential search problem can be reformulated as a discrete choice problem without search frictions.
choice perspective, where an increase in search costs reduces a consumer's list of reservation prices r i and hence causes her adjusted valuations w i to fall stochastically. It is natural that, in many cases, a fall in the distribution for valuations in an oligopoly discrete choice model will lead to lower equilibrium prices.
To illustrate these observations, consider the "double uniform" example from section 3, where variation in r i stems from heterogeneous inspection costs s i rather than from heterogeneous distributions for match utility F i . 37 Using Figure 3 one can calculate the symmetric equilibrium price which in this example is about 0.31. In the same example with hidden prices, we saw that the symmetric equilibrium price was about 0.49 which, as expected, is above the equilibrium advertised price. If the example is modi…ed so that search costs are identically zero, in which case w i is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], the equilibrium price (with or without price advertising) would be p 2 1 0:41, which is higher than in the situation with search frictions and advertised prices. 
Searching questions
This article has discussed a range of situations in which consumers plausibly search in a deliberate order. We saw how sellers which were …rst in line often had an incentive to set lower prices than those further back, and this gave a consumer an incentive to mimic the search order followed by other consumers. Likewise, consumers wish to click …rst on the advertiser which supplies the most relevant product, and advertisers with the most relevant products had the greatest incentive to pay for a prominent position. These kinds of selfful…lling prophecies made ordered search a stable equilibrium. 39 Because the seller which is inspected …rst typically makes greater pro…t than its rivals, sellers have an incentive to move to the front of the queue for consumers. Ways they might have to do this include merging or co-locating alongside other sellers, advertising intensively, advertising the lowest price, or selling other products to the pool of consumers in the past.
There are two broad themes in this paper. One is more methodological, which is to show how the complex scenario with optimal sequential search can be reformulated as a simple discrete choice problem without search frictions. An implication of this is that oligopoly search models often "work better"when the demand system is smoothed by giving consumers heterogeneous preferences over which seller to …rst inspect. (This can be done by making consumers heterogeneous in their brand preferences or, perhaps more simply, making them heterogeneous with respect to their seller-speci…c search costs.) When each consumer views sellers as symmetric ex ante, small changes in anticipated or advertised prices lead to a discrete jump in a seller's demand. When prices are hidden, this often gives rise to the multiple equilibria discussed above, while when prices are advertised this feature leads to the use of mixed pricing strategies.
A second theme is how changes in search costs a¤ect outcomes. A quite robust result was that a multiproduct seller had an incentive to "damage"its retail environment: instead of permitting consumers to see product characteristics transparently, it was more pro…table to deliberately make it costly to inspect some products. When separate sellers each supply a single product and prices are hidden, a rise in one seller's inspection cost typically cause that seller and its rivals to raise prices. A higher inspection cost means that many of the consumers the seller encounters are unsatis…ed with other options and so the seller can a¤ord to set a high price, while a rival also usually has an incentive to raise its price since it knows consumers have less desirable alternative options. Thus, we expect there will be positive own-and cross-cost passthrough of inspection costs, as well as the more familiar positive passthrough of production costs. Because of this, a seller may have an incentive to raise its own inspection cost arti…cially as a way to relax competition. Although an industry-wide increase in search frictions will typically raise equilibrium prices when those prices are hidden, the opposite is likely to be the case when prices are advertised: higher search costs make a consumer more likely to buy at the …rst seller they inspect, and this intensi…es competition to become the seller it is most attractive to investigate …rst.
Several interesting questions for further study remain. One of these is the issue of product design, where a seller has some freedom to choose the distribution for its match utility (as well as its price). By incurring a cost a seller might be able to shift this distribution upwards, so that it o¤ers a higher-quality product. Alternatively, a seller might be able to choose between a "niche" or a "mass market" design, where the former is associated with a riskier distribution for match utility. Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cunat (2012) discuss this issue in the context of monopolistic competition and random consumer search, focussing on the impact of lower search costs on the choice of product design. It would be interesting to investigate this in the context of ordered search. Does a prominent seller have di¤erent incentives to choose its design from those sellers further back? While Pandora's rule suggests that consumers would like to inspect niche (i.e., riskier) products …rst, it is less clear that a prominent seller has an incentive to o¤er a niche product design.
It would interesting to study how knowledge of which product is the current "bestseller"
can be used to guide optimal search. As with the classical herding models of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) , suppose that consumers buy in sequence. Unlike these herding models, though, consumers have no private signal about which product is better, but merely observe which product has sold the most to date. Here, it seems plausible that, given that previous consumers have started their search process with the then-current bestseller, a consumer should optimally start her search with the current bestseller. 40 In this scenario, it seems possible that the …rst consumer buys an inferior product and all subsequent consumers follow suit, with the result that an inferior popular product becomes the best-seller in the long run. This would not be possible in an alternative situation where all consumers searched randomly.
The discussion of optimal pricing and store layout in section 4.2 introduces what seems to be a rich seam for further investigation, namely, how a multiproduct retailer should choose its prices and its retail environment to maximize pro…t. Related issues arise also in a number of public policy discussions, and this framework might be a fruitful way to add to those discussions. For instance, is the optimal way to discourage consumption of unhealthy products to tax them, to place them away from eye level, or to use a mixture of both policies? In addition, it would be interesting to investigate the optimal way to sell within some natural class of contracts and layout plans. If feasible, for instance, the multiproduct seller in section 4.2 could charge the consumer the cost s in (8) to inspect the product rather than make the consumer pay this cost as a search friction from which it obtains no direct gain.
This paper focussed on situations in which consumers could freely choose their order of search. In other environments the search order is exogenously imposed. A driver on a motorway looking for fuel encounters service stations in order, and consumers have to decide now whether to buy the current model of phone or wait to see if a better or cheaper model is released next year. When consumers di¤er in their search costs, a likely outcome is that equilibrium prices fall as consumers move through the exogenous search order, in contrast to the situations discussed in section 3. Consumers with high search costs stop searching early, leaving later sellers to face consumers who are more inclined to shop around.
For instance, currency exchange in an airport's arrivals hall might be more expensive than outside the airport, to exploit those travellers reluctant to search for a better deal. with 'A' or a number, and also that these …rms attract a disproportionate number of consumer complaints. He interprets this as being consistent with a market with expert and uninformed consumers, where the latter are assumed to search for a supplier in alphabetic order (even though this is not the optimal way to search given that low-quality plumbers apparently are listed …rst).
While writing this paper, my own search for useful articles was far from random. I was guided by keyword searches combined with citation counts from search engines and by the 41 For further discussion see Arbatskaya (2007) and Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009, section 4) . 42 See Huang (2015) and Richardson (2008) , respectively. bibliographies in papers I had read previously, I investigated authors who worked in the wider area and whose work I already admired, I inspected journals I expected to contain good papers, I solicited recommended readings from colleagues, and was biased towards sources which were more easily inspected (journal articles and working papers rather than book chapters, say, or "economics" rather than "marketing" papers). Doubtless I have missed interesting and relevant work. One disadvantage of ordered search, relative to the ancient process of browsing more randomly through library shelves, is that serendipitous discovery becomes less likely. we have i A i 1, and since she must inspect a box if she selects it we have A i I i . The consumer's expected payo¤ from using the search procedure is
Here, the …rst equality holds using the de…nition of r i together with the fact that I i and v i are independent variables, while the …rst inequality holds since A i I i . However, the search procedure determined by Pandora's rule has equality in these two inequalities. For the …rst, note that if the consumer inspects but does not select box i, i.e., if A i < I i , then it must be that v i r i , and for the second we have already shown that the procedure selects the box with the highest w i . We deduce that Pandora's rule generates the highest expected payo¤ for the consumer. one can calculate that seller 1's demand as a function ofp 1 , which from (5) is the fraction of consumers for whom minfr 1 p 1 ; v 1 p 1 g maxfminfr 2 p 2 ; v 2 p 2 g; 0g ;
C. Details of argument that more prominent sellers face more elastic demand:
Suppose all consumers search through the sellers in the same order. Suppose hypothetically that all sellers are expected to charge the same price p (where p < r so that consumers search at all), and consider a seller's elasticity of demand with respect to a small change in its own price. By Pandora's rule, when consumers expect the same price p < r from all sellers they will buy from the …rst seller which o¤ers payo¤ v p above r p (wherep is a seller's actual price), and if no payo¤ meets this threshold they will buy from the seller with the highest payo¤ provided this is positive. Using the terminology in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) , demand from consumers who buy immediately (i.e., if v p r p) is a seller's "fresh demand", while demand from those consumers who buy from the seller only after exhausting all options is its "return demand". 45 The seller which is m th in the search order has fresh demand in terms of its actual pricep equal to
(This is because a consumer only reaches it if she did not …nd a match v above r from the previous m 1 sellers, and the consumer will then buy immediately if v p r p.) If there are n sellers in all, this seller's return demand is
where the …rst equality follows since a …rm sells to a return consumer if v p is below the threshold r p (for otherwise she would have purchased immediately) and above all the other …rms' o¤ers and the outside option of zero, and the second follows after changing variables from v toṽ = v + p p. Thus, fresh demand is proportional to 1 F (r +p p), scaled down geometrically as the seller is placed further back in the search order, while return demand does not depend on the the seller's position in the search order. When f (v)=(1 F (v)) increases with v, any seller's fresh demand is more elastic than its return demand (evaluated at pricep = p). To see this, note that
which establishes the claim. 46 Since a more prominent seller (i.e., a seller with smaller m in (14)) has a greater volume of fresh demand relative to its return demand, it follows that this seller's total demand is more elastic than that of its rivals further back.
D. Duopoly example where r is constant and v is uniformly distributed on [0,1]:
Look for an equilibrium in which equilibrium prices satisfy p 1 < p 2 < r, so that all consumers inspect seller 1 …rst and if they do not buy immediately from seller 1 they go on to inspect seller 2. From Figure 2, 
The equilibrium prices can then be explicitly (but messily) solved for each search cost such that 1 2 r 1 from the pair of conditions (16)- (17), and are depicted in Figure   4 . (When r < 1 2
, the search cost is so high that there is no equilibrium where consumers participate in the market.) 46 Here, the …rst inequality follows from the assumption that f =(1 F ) is increasing, the second inequality also follows from f =(1 F ) being increasing and the fact thatṽ r, while the …nal equality follows from the de…nitions of q F and q R . 
